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Introduction
For decades, international legal theory made its home in law schools,
while international relations (IR) theory made its home in political science
departments. The two academic fields address the same subject matter,
but until recently they rarely took notice of one another.' Both interna-
t Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor, Valparaiso University
Law School. In venturing into the subject matter of this Article, I have drawn on the
expertise of dear, old friends, Zachary Braiterman and Mark Raider, who then referred
me to scholars of the modern Middle East, Miriam Ellman and Martin Malin, who
generously directed me to useful sources. Thanks to my research assistant, Janelle
Thompson, for her research on social media and on the international response to the
crisis in Syria.
1. See, e.g., OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJu KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND POLITICS iii (2005) ("Until recently, international law and international
politics have been two disciplines divided by a common subject matter."); Kenneth W.
Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14
YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 337 (1989) (noting that with few exceptions, "scholars in these two
fields have long proceeded on separate tracks"); id. at 337-38 (observing that interna-
tional legal scholars, until recently, had no interest in dialogue with IR realists); Stephen
D. Krasner, International Law and International Relations: Together, Apart, Together?, 1
CHI. J. INT'L L. 93, 93 (2000). After a 1982 conference, Krasner concluded that interna-
tional legal scholars were doing something different from what political scientists and
economists were doing, although those differences were hard to define. Krasner sug-
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tional legal theory2 and IR theory focused on states as the actors relevant to
their explanatory models. However, while IR theory was dominated by
realism, which assumed states to be unitary, rational actors seeking to
achieve self-interested goals,3 international legal theory asserted that states
were subject to an external system of laws that exercised a normative pull
on states in the conduct of their foreign relations.4
Recently, the two disparate traditions have come together to a degree.5
International legal theorists have begun to recognize that IR's embrace of
regime theory moved that discipline closer to the orbit of international
law.6 International legal scholars have also come to value the theoretical
gests that the divide between the two disciplines became much wider beginning in 1979
as IR began to develop its neo-realist research agenda. Id. at 94-95.
2. The major exception to this generalization regarding international legal theory is
the New Haven School. For overviews of the New Haven approach, see, for example, 1
HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992)
(introducing the policy-oriented approach of the New Haven school, but predating the
use of the term); W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDER-
STANDING AND SHAPING LAW (1987).
3. Abbott dates the advent of realism to the writings of Thucydides and describes
realism as having dominated IR theory for over two thousand years. Abbott, supra note
1, at 337 n.12. For classic statements of the realist position, see generally E.H. CARR,
THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIs, 1919-1939 (2001) (detailing the rise of realist thought in
sixteenth-century Europe); HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLUTICS
AMONG NATIONS (6th ed. 1985) (describing six principles of realist theory). Leading IR
theorists assert that realist orthodoxy remains relevant even though it has been subject
to numerous criticisms. See, e.g., Stephen M. Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist
Tradition, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 197, 197 (Ira Katznelson &
Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (stating that "[r]ealist theories are still widely criticized, but
the realist tradition has yet to be supplanted . . . "); Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew Moravc-
sik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?, 24 INT'L SECURITY 5 (1999). For the most part, those
associated with the neorealist school have succeeded classical realists as the bearers of
the banner of realism. See, e.g., NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 15-16 (Robert 0. Keohane
ed., 1986); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
4. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 3
(1995) (noting instances where international law has restrained the exercise of national
sovereignty); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 4 (2d ed. 1979) ("[L]aw is a major
force in international affairs; nations rely on it, invoke it, observe and are influenced by
it in every aspect of their foreign relations."); see also ABRAM CHAYEs & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 1-33 (1995). See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) (arguing that the perceived legitimacy of
international laws compels states to comply with them).
5. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Political Science Research on International Law:
The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 47, 48 (2012) (acknowledging prominent collab-
orations in which political scientists and international legal scholars have shared
research methods and insights, but also remarking that "the two fields are still notable
for their distance"); see also Krasner, supra note 1, at 96-97 (arguing that neo-liberal
institutionalist and constructivist trends have brought IR and international legal theory
closer together). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and Inter-
national Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 367 (1998) (describing the recent overlap between IR theory and international
legal scholarship)
6. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1993) (noting that international
lawyers quickly realized that regime theory was a recasting of international law in IR
terms).
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insights that IR theory has generated.7 Many international legal scholars
now draw on a rationalist approach indebted to game theory and share
many assumptions with IR realists.8
At the same time, IR theorists are incorporating normative theory into
their models for explaining the international system 9 and are increasing
their awareness of how international legal institutions function.10 In addi-
tion, liberal IR theory has expanded the focus of its inquiry to include non-
state actors.'" IR theorists and international legal theorists alike now rec-
ognize and appreciate the importance of non-state actors in shaping inter-
national norms and international law.' 2 Such "transnational legal theory"
7. See Jens David Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium and International Law, 96 CORNELL L.
REv. 869, 870 (2011) (observing that game theory has played a central role in IR theory
for decades, but has only recently gained traction in international legal theory); see also
Slaughter Burley, supra note 6, at 226-38 (building on insights from IR institutionalism
to set out a research agenda for a "liberal" international legal theory). See generally
Abbott, supra note 1, at 342-404 (detailing key theoretical innovations in modern IR
theory and describing how insights derived from IR theory might benefit international
legal scholarship).
8. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in Interna-
tional Law, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1404, 1405 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC
A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005)) (observing that a rationalist, inter-
est-based perspective has largely been absent from international legal scholarship but
"has long been dominant in political science"). See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC
A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005); ANDREw T. GUZMAN, How INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008). Goldsmith and Posner claim
that a "major generational change is underway," as international legal scholars reject the
normative approaches associated with the "traditional international law scholarship of
their elders." Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Response, The New International Law
Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 465 (2006). Given that rationalist theory is
so similar to traditional international relations realist theory, it is not surprising that
political scientists find the arguments of international legal theory rationalists to add
little to political science scholarship. Id. at 483 n.58.
9. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnde & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructiv-
ism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
19, 20-21 (2000) (observing that constructivism, a theoretical framework emerging in
response to the rationalism dominant during the Cold War, focuses on "the role that
culture, institutions and norms play in shaping identity and influencing behavior").
Major constructivist works include the following: MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTER-
ESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS (1999); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992).
10. Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 5, at 49; see ADRIANA SINCLAIR, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (2010) (arguing that IR theorists need to
understand law because "legalism percolates through every level of our society").
11. See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Interna-
tional Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 516-17 (1997) (asserting that one of liberal theory's
"core assumptions" is the idea that individuals and private groups are "the fundamental
actors in international politics").
12. For examples of works by legal scholars who no longer focus exclusively or pri-
marily on state action, see generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEw WORLD ORDER
(2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEw SovER-
EIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)). For exam-
ples of works by IR theorists who now look beyond state actors to focus on domestic and
transnational non-governmental organizations, see generally MARGARET E. KECK &
KATHRYN SHGGqNK, AcnviSTs BEYOND BORDERS (1998); SIDNEY TARRoW, THE NEW TRANSNA-
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problematizes the assumption underlying both realism and neo-realism
that states can be treated as rational actors able to identify, and seek to
maximize, their interests.13
This Article targets rationalism as articulated in the works of Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner. It focuses on Goldsmith and Posner for two
reasons. First, Goldsmith and Posner represent the purest (or most
extreme) version of rationalism in that they view international law as
entirely the product of states pursuing their own self-interest. Second,
although rationalism is a theory, its significance is not purely theoretical.
Goldsmith and Posner's scholarship is extremely influential both in the
academy and in political spheres. Within the academy, Goldsmith and Pos-
ner see themselves as leading a generational revolt against received
orthodoxies concerned with the law's normative pull.' 4 In the political
realm, Jack Goldsmith served as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel
during the George W. Bush administration.1 5 In that position, he led a
team, which included others sympathetic to his take on international law,
that helped shape U.S. foreign policy and the administration's approach to
issues of compliance with international law. 16
Because this Article focuses on the works of Goldsmith and Posner, it
fails to do justice to other forms of rationalist theory that are more complex
and more favorably oriented towards the possibility that international law
actually can shape the behavior of states.' 7 Still, for the purposes of an
assessment of rationalism's applicability to the Middle East, Goldsmith and
Posner are representative in that rationalist legal theory, in all its diversity,
posits states as the relevant actors on the international stage.
This Article uses recent events in the Middle East to highlight the diffi-
culties that the rationalist model faces in properly accounting for the trans-
formations of international law and politics in the contemporary Middle
East wrought by numerous, diverse non-state actors. Part I introduces the
basic elements of the rationalist model as well as leading criticisms of the
TIONAL ACTIVISM (2005); Andrew Moravcsik, The New Liberalism, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 234 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds.,
2008).
13. Proponents of the new rationalist account of international law occasionally note
that their model's assumption that states are rational, self-interested actors is not always
justified. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 4 (Goldsmith and Posner note that
their assumptions based on rational choice are all open to question); GuzMAN, supra
note 8, at 17 (in his book, Guzman assumes that states are "rational, self-interested, and
able to identify and pursue their interests"); id. at 22 (Guzman starts with a set of
assumptions underpinning liberal and constructivist theories rather than a set of obser-
vations). They nonetheless proceed with this assumption.
14. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 8, at 465 (noting a generational change in
which young international law scholars reject "the traditional international law scholar-
ship of their elders").
15. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 9, 11 (2007) (detailing Goldsmith's
experiences as head of the Office of Legal Counsel).
16. Id. at 20-21.
17. See Ohlin, supra note 7, at 881-91 (illustrating how game theory shows that
compliance with international law can be simultaneously motivated by norms and self-
interest).
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model that are more fully developed in the next two sections. Part II tests
rationalist assumptions in the contexts of the Israeli incursion into Gaza
and the Libyan revolt against Colonel Ghaddafi's government. In a brief
concluding section, the Article explores the usefulness of normative mod-
els as descriptive tools for understanding the relevance of international law
in the decision-making processes of both state and non-state actors. While
the Article concedes that such normative models are imperfect predictors
of conduct, such models can usefully supplement rationalist approaches by
supplying richer descriptions of the role of international law in shaping the
conduct of actors on the international stage.
1. Rationalist International Legal Theory and Its Critics
This Part highlights the three main theoretical assumptions of rational-
ist theory and then proceeds to outline the problems that arise from those
assumptions. The great advantage of the rationalist approach to interna-
tional law is its parsimony. 18 The rationalist model has very few working
parts; it takes into account only a few variables and thus transforms inter-
national legal theory from a descriptive into an explanatory and predictive
model.19 As Goldsmith and Posner put it, "international law emerges from
states acting rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions
of the interests of other states and the distribution of state power."20
While critics of rationalism point out the dangers of a predictive model
based on assumptions that may not completely reflect the complexities and
subtleties of international relations, those same critics acknowledge that
their own, more complex models do not so readily generate testable
hypotheses and therefore lack predictive force. 21
A. Components of Rationalist Theory
Rationalist theory treats states and only states as the relevant actors
18. See GUZMAN, supra note 8, at 21 (justifying assumptions based on rational choice
because, among other things, it presents the most parsimonious theory).
19. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1424 ("For a theory to be useful, it
must make particularized predictions about specific events.").
20. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 3; see also GUZMAN, supra note 8, at 17
(assuming for the purposes of the operative theory that states are rational, self-interested
actors); Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 8, at 463. Note that up to this point, rational-
ism does not differ from modern IR theory, which also assumes that states are rational,
egoistic, unitary actors. Abbott, supra note 1, at 349-51.
21. See John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism
and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 855, 883 (1998) (arguing that con-
structivism "lacks rigor and specification ... [and] remains relatively poor at specifying
... the contexts within which its explanatory features can be expected to take effect").
But see Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their World, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1720, 1738 n.83
(2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIc A. POSNER, THE LIMITS O INTERNATIONAL
LAw (2005)) (contending that, when trying to account for dynamic rather than static
state systems, traditional international legal theory is "more parsimonious and intui-
tively satisfying" than Goldsmith and Posner's rationalism).
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for the purpose of understanding international law.22 While rationalists
acknowledge that non-state actors play a role in international affairs, they
do not consider the role of non-state actors as essential to explaining and
predicting the course of international law. Goldsmith and Posner explain
that "international law addresses itself to states and, for the most part, not
to individuals or other entities," and so they have little to say about sub-
state units, multinational corporations, and transnational NGOs.2 3
Rationalists are generally committed to treating states as unitary
actors.24 Rationalist theory associates the preferences of states with those
of a state's "leadership,"25 which usually means the leaders of the state's
executive branch of government, since that branch has the dominant role
in formulating foreign policy. Rationalist theory thus downplays the
importance of competing factions within the executive branch and does
not devote much attention to legislative input into international law-mak-
ing or foreign policy decision-making. Rationalists assume that domestic
courts can and should play no role in shaping international legal rules or
compliance with such rules.26
Finally, and not surprisingly, rationalism assumes rationality. As
Andrew Guzman puts it, "States are assumed to be rational, self-interested,
and able to identify and pursue their interests."27 "Rationality" here means
that states are guided by their perceived self-interest and not by legal
norms, which rationalists treat as a product of state interests.28 While
some versions of rationalism characterize international law as the result of
22. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 4-5 (explaining their reasons for
"giv[ing] the state the starring role in our drama"); see also GuzMAN, supra note 8, at 8-9
(stating that his book endeavors to explain "how international law is able to affect state
behavior").
23. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 5; see GuzMAN, supra note 8 at 21 (describ-
ing liberal and constructivist IR theories, which focus on non-state actors, as useful in
helping to understand how states' preferences come into being).
24. GuzMAN, supra note 8, at 19 (faulting liberal international legal theory for its
complexity and noting that his own book, in order to provide a predictive model, largely
"retains the assumption of a unitary state"). IR realists and institutionalists likewise
"assume that states are undifferentiated unitary actors." Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra
note 8, at 1432. Hathaway and Lavinbuk consider Anne-Marie Slaughter's liberal theory
to be a form of rationalism that does not subscribe to the theory of the state as unitary
actor. Id. at 1432-33.
25. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 6 (identifying a link between state inter-
ests and the interests of the state's leadership); Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 8, at 472
("[W]e generally identify the state interest with the interest (preferences) of its leader-
ship . . . .").
26. This is not true of all forms of rationalism, but it is true of its chief practitioners.
See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1406-07 (arguing that many of Goldsmith
and Posner's negative views regarding the limits of international law derive not from
acknowledged rationalist assumptions but from unacknowledged revisionist tendencies,
including the view that the political branches, and not courts, should determine how,
and the extent to which, the United States abides by its international obligations).
27. GuzMAN, supra note 8, at 17.
28. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 13 (observing that international law
could not be a check on state self-interest because it is a product of state self-interest).
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states acting in their self-interest,29 other versions acknowledge the possi-
bility that international law can affect state preferences and thus can shape
states' conceptions of their own self-interest.30
Rationalism conceives itself to have advanced beyond classical realist
theory in that, like neo-realism, it abandons the dual realist assumptions
that states' core concern is security and that states aim for relative rather
than absolute benefits.3 ' These two core assumptions rendered interna-
tional cooperation difficult to explain in realist terms. 32 Rationalism
deploys game-theoretic models (mostly cooperation and coordination
games) to explain state behavior within the international system.33 This
Article will not take up the game-theoretic aspects of rationalism in any
detail. Rather, it calls into question the assumptions that inform the
model. Detailed discussion of the flaws of rationalism's use of game the-
ory is superfluous if the game-theoretic models on which rationalism relies
draw on faulty assumptions.34
B. The Limits of Rationalist Theory
IR theory has produced an extensive literature evaluating rationalist
theory.35 This literature focuses on three aspects of rationalist theory: its
assumption that states are sufficiently unified to identify and act on their
perceived self-interest; its assumption of rationality and implicit rejection
of the notion that legal norms drive compliance with international law; and
its focus on states as the only relevant actors in international relations, law,
29. See id. at 225 (concluding that states comply with international law not because
law is an independent force that influences state behavior but because compliance
accords with self-interest); Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International
Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIc A. POSNER,
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005)) (criticizing Goldsmith and Posner for
"deployling] the simplifying assumptions of rational choice theory in an attempt to
demonstrate that international law has no independent valence whatsoever").
30. See, e.g., GUZMAN, supra note 8, at 211-13 (concluding that international law can
affect state behavior because states are concerned that violations of international law
may affect their reputations, lead to reciprocal violations, or cause retaliation); Kal Raus-
tiala, Refining The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT & CoMP. L 423, 434-35
(2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIc A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw (2005)) (noting that some forms of rationalism recognize the importance of inter-
national law and observing that even though "international agreements are the deliber-
ate product of state design . . . [that] does not vitiate the claim that they shape state
behavior").
31. Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1429-30.
32. GUZMAN, supra note 8, at 18. But see Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at
1429-32 (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner's views on whether states seek absolute or
relative benefits are unclear).
33. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 11-13 (proposing four models of stra-
tegic behavior: coincidence of interests, coordination, cooperation, and coercion); Guz-
MAN, supra note 8, at 25-32 (introducing a game-theoretic model for testing the relevance
of international law).
34. See Berman, supra note 29, at 1272 (finding "nothing particularly 'rigorous' or
'empirical' about using game theory to speculate about how states act").
35. See Slaughter et al., supra note 5, at 394-97 (providing a bibliography of publica-
tions in IR theory, several of which analyze contemporary realism and related
controversies).
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and politics. While this Section will briefly summarize the first two sets of
criticisms, for the purposes of this Article the critique of rationalist the-
ory's focus on states is the most pertinent.3 6
1. Critique of the Unified Rational State
Rationalists set out to improve the discipline of international legal
scholarship through attention to methodological and empirical stan-
dards.37 Rationalism has clear scientific-or at least scientistic-ambi-
tions. It aspires to "fram[e] claims as testable hypotheses."38 In order to
do so, it self-consciously simplifies the world of international relations and
international law.39 It sweeps aside suggestions that considerations other
than self-interest might motivate states; in doing so, rationalism obscures
the perhaps more significant challenges of applying theory to the complex
processes whereby states identify and pursue their interests in the first
place.
a) Focus on Unity
Rationalists renounce all assumptions as to the interests that drive
state conduct and acknowledge that "generalization is hazardous."40
Sometimes states are driven by pursuit of security; sometimes by pursuit of
prosperity. Rationalist theory cannot tell us when one interest will prevail
over another nor if we can even know what interest is driving foreign policy
at any given time.4 ' As a result, rationalists run into difficulties because
they are no better at identifying states' interests than are international legal
36. Rationalism encompasses a wide range of approaches. This Article focuses on
the work of Goldsmith and Posner both because it represents a rather pure form of
rationalism and because their approach has been widely influential in the academy and
in government (the latter influence stemming from Jack Goldsmith's position as director
of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice under the Bush administra-
tion). More flexible rationalist legal scholars have articulated elaborate critiques of
Goldsmith and Posner from within the rationalist paradigm. See generally, e.g., Oona A.
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U.
CHI. L. REv. 469 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Differ-
ence?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1821 (2003); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1
(2003); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE LJ. 559 (2003); Alan 0. Sykes, The
Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 403 (2003); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Coopera-
tive States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 VA.
J. INT'L L. 839 (2002).
37. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 8, at 466.
38. Id. at 466; see id. at 482 (claiming that the new wave of international legal schol-
arship frames "positive claims . . . as hypotheses that can, in principle, be tested").
39. See Hockett, supra note 21, at 1724 (discussing how all theories must simplify
the real world to an extent, but noting the tension between elegance and oversimplifica-
tion in theoretical models).
40. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 8, at 475.
41. In addition, Goldsmith and Posner speak of both state interest and state power
without analyzing how these two supposedly independent variables relate or differ. See
Hockett, supra note 21, at 1729-30.
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scholars who adopt normative theories. Even when rationalists focus on
particular case studies, they can offer only "reasonable conjectures" about
state interests. 42
But their critics observe that Goldsmith and Posner cannot even offer
reasonable conjectures if they refuse to engage in the difficult work of iden-
tifying the relevant domestic forces that contribute to the processes
whereby states identify their preferences.43 Such criticisms can come from
the perspective of liberal IR theory, which calls for greater attention to the
impact of civil society on state decision-making processes.44 They may
also come from the perspective of what, in international legal theory, is
known as the "managerial model," which regards the "interpretation, elabo-
ration, application, and . . . enforcement of international rules [as] accom-
plished through . .. interchange among the interested parties."45 Those
interested parties are not unitary states, but executive departments with
authority over foreign affairs as well as "bureaucratic or legislative bodies
with responsibility for the implementation" of international legal norms. 46
According to the managerial theory, bureaucracies are often motivated by a
commitment to such norms, especially if the people within that bureau-
cracy, who may be career diplomats or negotiators, had a hand in shaping
instruments of international law.4 7 From the perspective of the managerial
model, the non-unitary character of the state also creates an opening
through which international legal norms can introduce themselves into
state decision-making processes.48
b) Focus on Rationality
Rationalists generally cite their model's superior ability to predict
state behavior with respect to international law as one of the advantages
rationalism holds vis-A-vis other theoretical models.49 In practice, however,
42. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 8, at 475. For a rationalist critique of Gold-
smith and Posner on this point, see Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1406 (noting
that Goldsmith and Posner cannot explain "which state interests matter, how they are
formed, or how we are to discover them").
43. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1425-26 (faulting Goldsmith and
Posner for being unable to predict rates of compliance with international law because
their theory does not enable them to identify the relative values that states attach to their
interests); Raustiala, supra note 30, 436-43 (illustrating ways in which a rationalism that
ignores domestic politics cannot explain, for example, why a state would choose to join a
binding treaty regime rather than a non-binding soft law regime).
44. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 32 (calling the notion of the unitary state a
"useful fiction," but one that has outlived its usefulness and now "hides as much as it
helps").
45. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4, at 118.
46. Id. at 274.
47. See id. at 4-5 (outlining the factors that motivate state bureaucracies to promote
compliance with international obligations).
48. See id. at 8-9 (illustrating the ways in which state actors express their sense that
they are bound by international obligations).
49. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1424 ("For a theory to be useful, it
must make particularized predictions about specific events."); see also Goldsmith & Pos-
ner, supra note 8, at 473 (commenting that a comprehensive theory of international law
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rationalism has not established itself as a useful predictive tool, in part
because the rationalist model often simply assumes, rather than estab-
lishes, that states are self-interested, rational actors.50 As Kal Raustiala has
pointed out, rationalist models cannot explain the extraordinary growth in
the number of international agreements since World War II, nor can it
account for states' overwhelming compliance with their international
obligations.51
One aspect of the imminent critique of rationalism has been the intro-
duction of insights from behavioral economics to suggest that, to the extent
that rationalism relies on models derived from economic theory, it ought to
take into account the advances within that field. Behavioral economics
illustrates how, because even unitary individuals are limited in their ability
to identify their preferences, individuals are unable to maximize self-inter-
est efficiently. For one thing, individuals often have to act based on imper-
fect information.52 Even with perfect information, individuals exhibit an
"endowment effect," refusing to give up entitlements they possess even
though they would not have paid to acquire the entitlements in the first
place.53 In addition, individuals exercise only "bounded rationality,
bounded willpower and bounded self-interest."54 Rationality is "bounded"
because various judgment errors arise due to biases and heuristics. 5 As
Christine Jolls explains, the concept of bounded willpower is familiar to
anyone who has foregone the gym for an evening in front of the television
or has chosen to skip salad to save room for dessert.56 With respect to
bounded self-interest, recent research suggests "that many people care
about both giving and receiving fair treatment."57 As complicated as the
picture becomes when behavioral economics is applied to individuals, it is
still more complicated when applied to complex entities such as states.
based on domestic politics "would be too complicated . . . to yield general insights or
predictions").
50. See Berman, supra note 29, at 1271 (crediting Goldsmith and Posner for stating
their assumptions but faulting them for providing "only the thinnest of justifications for
employing [those assumptions]"); Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of International Law,
92 VA. L. REv. 533, 537 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERuC A. POSNER, THE
LMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005)) (criticizing Goldsmith and Posner for relying on
assumptions to argue that a rational choice model to international legal theory is
appropriate).
51. See Raustiala, supra note 30, at 429 (noting that, while rationalist theory would
predict that enforcement problems should render states less willing to enter into interna-
tional agreements, states frequently endeavor to negotiate international instruments and
maintain international organizations).
52. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1436 (noting that game theorists
have "recognized that incomplete information can undermine the emergence of coopera-
tive equilibria").
53. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, YALE L. SCH. 3 (Apr. 16, 2010),
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Faculty/Jolls-BehavioralLawandEconomics.
pdf.
54. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
55. See id. at 7-9 (discussing racial or group-based biases as well as biases associ-
ated with optimism, our self-serving natures, and hindsight).
56. Id. at 10.
57. Id. at 11.
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2. Critique of Rationalism's Focus on State Actors
Jordan Paust has forcefully rebutted the rationalist assumption that
states are the only relevant actors in international affairs. He details the
range of international agreements, as well as international and domestic
adjudications, to which non-state entities have been parties.58 Paust fur-
ther notes that customary international law, including customary human
rights and humanitarian law, can bind private actors such as corpora-
tions.59 More generally, Paust invokes the New Haven School in highlight-
ing the role that individuals play in the "formation, reaffirmation, and
termination of international law."60 Paust concludes that "it is irrefutable
that traditional international law, even through the early twentieth century,
recognized roles, rights, and duties of nations, tribes, peoples, belligerents,
and other entities and communities in addition to the state . . . ."61
In its quest for parsimony, rationalism can simplify the world of inter-
national relations and international law beyond recognition. 62 Robert
Hockett characterizes the dangers of rationalism as leaving us with the
following:
[A] world of fetishized, black-boxy Scrooge-states, incomprehensibly seeking
in large part to eat one another, calculating and gaming with those and with
cognate objectives in view, constrained by no more than the weapons that
others possess all while "empt[il]y, happ[il]y" or mendaciously speaking as
if the routines and mere memoranda of understanding that emerge from this
contest were law.63
Rationalists justify their focus on states on the ground that doing so in no
way hinders them from developing testable theses that can help predict
conduct in the realm of international affairs. 64 However, rationalism has
yet to make any testable predictions, and its critics maintain that it is inca-
pable of doing so in its present form.65 In addition to emphasizing the
important role of individuals and groups in shaping international law,
institutionalists point out the tendency of international regimes to outlive
58. JordanJ. Paust, Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense
of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 977, 978-85 (2011).
59. Id. at 987.
60. Id. at 1001.
61. Id. at 994; see also Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L 445, 447 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIc A. POSNER, THE
LIMITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005)) ("NGOs and corporations are now independently
consequential actors in the dynamic of international law, as an empirical matter, and so
international law models must move to take account of them.").
62. See Raustiala, supra note 30, at 424 (arguing that an unwavering rationalist
approach can be "clarifying," but it also can be simplistic and therefore "fail[ ] to explain
much of the texture of international cooperation").
63. Hockett, supra note 21, at 1722 (quoting GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at
180).
64. See David Gray, Rule-Skepticism, "Strategery," and the Limits of International Law,
46 VA. J. INT'L L. 563, 567-69 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERic A. POSNER,
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005)).
65. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1425 (finding Goldsmith and Pos-
ner's rationalist theory's predictive power "indeterminate because rationality can be
made to explain almost any outcome in the international system").
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their original purposes, suggesting that inertia is a major force in IR that
can shape and channel state interests.66
With these criticisms in mind, we proceed to a consideration of two
recent conflicts in the Middle East with an eye to testing the explanatory
force of rationalist theory. In this context, as in most, a rationalist lens can
generate some insights about state conduct. In fact, the economic model
upon which rationalism relies can be usefully adapted to help explain the
conduct of non-state actors as well. However, the complexity of domestic
and transnational politics that informs decision-makers in the Middle East
limits the utility of rationalist models in either describing or predicting the
role of international legal norms in Middle Eastern politics.
II. Two Applications of Rationalist Theory
One might expect that the chief challenge in applying rationalist the-
ory to the Middle East would be the irrationality of the Middle East-the
ideological blinders of states like Israel and Iran as well as non-state actors'
willingness to resort to random terror attacks. This Part argues to the con-
trary. Rationalist theory can quite easily accommodate both rogue states
(if there are any such entities in the contemporary Middle East) and terror
groups, as demonstrated by the relatively rich literature on the self-inter-
ested conduct of individual terrorists and terror organizations. 67 The big-
ger challenge to rationalist theory in the Middle East is the multiplicity of
state and non-state actors that undermines the parsimony that is rational-
ism's chief theoretical advantage. Nonetheless, this Part endeavors to imag-
ine what a rationalist approach has to offer with respect to the
contemporary Middle East.
A. Rationalism and the Libyan Conflict
A rationalist approach to the Libyan conflict has very little difficulty
dealing with the Ghaddafi regime. In a dictatorship, the rationalist
assumption that states can identify and act to maximize their preferences is
more likely to hold. There is little room for doubt that Libya's foreign pol-
icy was designed to maximize Ghaddafi's self-interest, and one key element
of that self-interest was Ghaddafi's continued control of the Libyan govern-
66. See Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,
20 Iwr'L SECURITY 39, 40 (1995) (noting that while realists predicted the demise of NATO
and the European Union at the end of the Cold War, institutionalism accurately pre-
dicted their survival and evolution).
67. See generally, e.g., WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
TERRORISM (2006) (elaborating a rational choice model of terrorism); Stephen J. Morse,
The Jurisprudence of Craziness, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 225,
256-58 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005) (considering the distinction
between irrational and rational terrorists); N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics in Dis-
array, 29 SOCIETY 19 (1992) (arguing that governments should not negotiate with ter-
rorists because a rational terrorist will not take hostages knowing that doing so will be
futile).
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ment. 68 As became clear in Spring 2011, there were undercurrents of
opposition to Ghaddafi's leadership, but rationalism would treat these non-
state actors as irrelevant for the purposes of its analysis. Because of its
determined focus on states as the only entities that matter in international
law and international relations, rationalists would regard the pre-Arab
Spring thoughts and actions of Libyan insurgents as irrelevant.
Although NATO's intervention in Libya is a little more troublesome
from the perspective of rationalist theory, it is not particularly difficult to
tweak the rationalist model so as to accommodate a supranational entity
such as NATO. Rationalist theory can treat NATO as a new unitary actor
whose behavior can be predicted by using the traditional assumptions
derived from rational choice theory. In fact, because only representatives
of the executive branches of NATO states make decisions for the body,69
NATO is a less complex entity compared to states, which must contend
with multiple, mutually checking branches of government and which are
accountable to a voting public.70
But any actor-state, non-state, multi-state-would have to consider
quite a few variables in determining whether or not to intervene in a situa-
tion such as Libya's. Consider, for example, the question of whether NATO
should intervene in Syria as it did in Libya. 7 ' As Amos Guiora puts it:
In both Libya and Syria a brutal regime was deliberately torturing, imprison-
ing and killing its own citizens. In both cases, thousands of citizens were
forced to flee their homes with the understanding that the regime would
brook no dissent, giving open fire orders that enabled indiscriminate shoot-
ing by its army into crowds of individuals. In other words, both regimes
were engaged in massacring their citizens. 72
In deciding whether or not to intervene, NATO leaders would certainly
take into account at least the following considerations: 1) natural
resources, the exploitation of which might be jeopardized by either contin-
ued conflict or by intervention;73 2) the threat that intervention might lead
68. See Craig R. Black, Muammar Qaddafi and Libya's Strategic Culture, in KNow THY
ENEMY: PROFILES OF ADVERSARY LEADERS AND THEIR STRATEGIC CULTURES 247, 250-51
(Barry R. Schneider & Jerrold M. Post eds., 2003), available at http://www.au.af.mil/
AU/AWC/AWCGATE/cpc-pubs/know_thy_enemy/black.pdf (describing Ghaddafi's sin-
gle-handed domination of Libya's policies beginning in 1969).
69. See North Atlantic Treaty art. 9, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
(describing the Council that is NATO's decision-making body).
70. See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic
and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 274 (2011) (observing that NATO's principal
decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, consists of representatives from each
member state). The U.S. representative is appointed by the President and has ambassa-
dor status. See Ambassador Ivo Daalder, UNITED STATES MISSION To NATO, http://
nato.usmission.gov/mission/ambassador.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
71. See Amos N. Guiora, Intervention in Libya, Yes; Intervention in Syria, No: Deci-
phering the Obama Administration, 44 CASE W. INT'L LJ. 251, 263-71 (2012) (contrast-
ing the Obama administration's "low profile" with respect to Syria with its active
participation in NATO's intervention in Libya).
72. Id. at 267.
73. See id. at 264-65 (noting the extent of European dependence on oil imports
from Libya).
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to a refugee crisis that could cause instability or unrest in neighboring
states; 3) whether or not the U.N. Security Council would authorize inter-
vention and the danger that Russia or China might take countermeasures
in the absence of such authorization;7 4 4) the expected cost of an interven-
tion that could succeed;75 5) the danger of casualties to NATO forces76 and
escalation of the conflict to neighboring states; and 6) the existence of pro-
democracy, Western-oriented groups among the opposition who would be
likely to establish a stable, democratically-accountable government in the
wake of a successful NATO intervention.77 Because rationalist theory is ill-
equipped to explore how NATO's member states would weigh these factors,
it provides little guidance to those trying to predict how NATO will behave
in a hard case.
However, the Libyan opposition is the real wildcard that makes the
reality of the Libyan conflict a bit more unruly than rationalism's parsimo-
nious assumptions can easily accommodate. Major Libyan opposition
groups include the National Transitional Council, the National Liberation
Army, the Libyan Islamic Movement, the Libyan Youth Movement, the Com-
mittee for Libyan National Action in Europe, the Libyan Freedom and
Democracy Campaign, and the National Conference for the Libyan Opposi-
tion. How these groups will interact in the post-Ghaddafi era is impossible
to predict with rationalist methodology, and thus rationalism cannot tell us
how the newly emerging Libyan state will go about identifying and seeking
to realize its preferences. It seems safe to predict that a certain amount of
dissent and violence will occur, as it did in Iraq after the United States
removed Saddam Hussein from power, and as is occurring now in post-
Mubarak Egypt.78 Such generalizations are easy, but predicting the spe-
cific dynamics of an emerging democracy requires a familiarity with the
multiplicity of actors in civil society and their sources of external support
that rationalist theory chooses, for the most part, to ignore.79
74. Anne Gearan, U.S. Syria Policy a Nod to Assad's Firm Grip, YAHoo! NEWs (Apr.
19, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/us-syria-policy-tacit-nod-assads-firm-grip-0626140
65.html (describing the key differences between intervention in Libya and a possible
intervention in Syria).
75. See Guiora, supra note 71, at 268 (noting that by the end of August 2011, the
U.S. had flown more than 5,300 sorties over Libya, was providing 70% of the intelligence
capabilities and refueling assets, and had spent nearly $900 million on the NATO
intervention).
76. See Gearan, supra note 74 (noting that Syrian air defenses are significantly more
sophisticated than those of Libya).
77. See Guiora, supra note 71, at 269 (characterizing the Syrian opposition as disor-
ganized and poorly armed compared with the Libyan opposition); YochiJ. Dreazen, The
Pentagon's (Preliminary, Shaky, and Hypothetical) War Plan for Syria, THE An.ANrc (Mar.
8, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-pentagons-
preliminary-shaky-and-hypothetical-war-plan-for-syria/254153/ (suggesting that hestita-
tions about the wisdom of intervention in Syria are linked to uncertainty associated with
the rebel groups and fears that they might have ties to Islamic terror organizations).
78. See David D. Kirkpatrick, As Violence Continues, Egyptian General Blames Protes-
tors, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/middle
east/as-violence-continues-egypt-news-media-clash-over-its-cause.html?pagewanted=all
(describing four days of street fighting in which thirteen people were killed).
79. See supra text accompanying note 23.
64 Vol. 46
2013 Non-State Actors in the Middle East
Jordan Paust, in his keynote address for this Symposium, points out a
key consideration that escapes the notice of rationalist theorists. Interna-
tional law recognizes a human right of self-determination.80 This right,
Paust reminds us, is vested not in states but in the people.8 1 Clearly, the
fact that this right has been reiterated in so many international instruments
and recognized by numerous international bodies, human rights organiza-
tions, and adjudicatory bodies contributes to the mindset of the Libyan
opposition forces.
B. Rationalism and Israel's Operation "Cast Lead"
Certain structural elements of Israeli politics, society, and culture
make it a strong candidate to be an ideal unitary state actor for the pur-
poses of rationalist theory.82 Its parliamentary model, with a single legis-
lative body subject to guidance by the governing party or parties, should
enable its political branches to speak with one voice. The Israeli military,
which is enormous in relation to Israel's population,83 answers to the
Israeli Defense Minister, who usually possesses a great deal of military
expertise84 and sits in the Israeli cabinet. The Defense Minister is usually
seen as the second most powerful member of the cabinet after the Prime
Minister.85 Israel has become so habituated to international condemna-
tion that it would be easy to believe that Israel's decision-makers feel them-
selves relatively unencumbered by the threat of international
opprobrium. 86
On the other hand, since the end of the Labor Party's dominance of
Israeli electoral politics in the 1970s, Israel has been governed by fragile
80. See Jordan J. Paust, International Law, Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring,
46 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1, 5 (2013) (citing various international instruments recognizing
the rights of peoples freely to determine their political status).
81. Id.
82. See COLIN SHINDLER, A HISTORY OF MODERN ISRAEL 77 (2008) (describing the suc-
cess of Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, in building a coalition with
weaker parties while excluding serious rivals so that his Mapai Party could carry out its
program of state building without serious parliamentary resistance).
83. The Israeli Defense Forces have 176,500 regular troops and 445,000 reserves.
INST. FOR NAT'L SECURITY STUDIES, ISRAEL (May 8, 2012), at 11, available at http://
www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1336472780.pdf
84. Most Israeli Defense Ministers, including Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizman, Ariel
Sharon, Yitzchak Rabin, Yitzchak Mordechai, Ehud Barak, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, and
Shaul Mofaz, had extensive military careers before they entered politics. See SCHINDLER,
supra note 82, at 3 (observing that the majority of Israeli chiefs of staff since 1967 have
subsequently gone into politics).
85. Many Israeli Defense Ministers served simultaneously as Prime Ministers. The
list includes David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol, Menachem Begin, Yitzchak Rabin, Shimon
Peres, and Ehud Barak. See id. (noting that "military men" were in power in Israel for ten
out of fourteen years between 1992 and 2006).
86. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin dismissed criticisms of the
Israeli military for having stood by while Lebanese Christian militias perpetrated mas-
sacres of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in 1981, com-
plaining that non-Jews had killed non-Jews "and the whole world [was] trying to hang
the Jews for the crime." Id. at 179.
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coalition governments.87 Coalition partners have aligned and realigned
through political vote trading related to Israel's policies, particularly its for-
eign policy and the sensitive issues surrounding the country's relationship
with its Arab neighbors and Israel's treatment of its domestic non-Jewish
populations.8 8 To take just one example, the Labor Party's one-time leader,
Ehud Barak, was named Israel's Defense Minister in a recent government
coalition, despite the fact that his party garnered less than 10% of the vote
in Israel's most recent national elections.89 Barak wields power dispropor-
tionate to his electoral strength because the government would fall if his
party left the governing coalition. His power in this regard is checked by
the willingness of other small parties to join the governing coalition on
terms of their own choosing90 and by the prospect that if no new coalition
could be formed there would be new elections, which may not improve
Barak's prospects.
In addition, Israel's government is checked by a robust system of judi-
cial review, with a Supreme Court that is not afraid to rule on issues rele-
vant to national security,9 ' and by a well-informed and well-organized
citizenry whose commitment to the international rule of law is often
informed by its citizens' collective histories. The Israeli courts have also
been avenues through which international legal norms have come to
inform Israel's political culture.92 Amichai Cohen has argued that the
Israeli army itself has become a venue for the internalization of interna-
tional humanitarian legal norms through its International Law
87. Parlimentary Groups in Governments, THE KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.il/
faction/eng/FactionGovernment eng.asp (last visited, Apr. 14, 2013).
88. JONG S. JUN, RETHINKING ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW
CENTURY 223 (2002).
89. Rory McCarthy, We're Nobody's Fig-Leaf, Insists Ehud Barak as Labour Joins
Israel's Far Right in Coalition with Binyamin Netanyahu, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2009), http:/
/www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/25/israel-ehud-barak-binyamin-netanyahu.
90. In May 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the formation of a new
"mega-coalition" including 94 members of the 120 seat Knesset. The Labor Party is not
a part of the new coalition government, but Barak, who left the Labor party in 2011, is
now part of a new Independence Party and has retained his position as Defense Minis-
ter. See Jodi Rudoren, Master Tactician in Israel Adds Power in a Coalition Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (May 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/world/middleeast/shaul-
mofaz-agrees-to-join-benjamin-netanyahus-coalition.html?_r-1 &ref=israel.
91. See Samia Chouchane, The Judicialization of Israeli Military Ethics: A Political
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 20 BULLETIN DU
CENTRE DE RECHERCHE FRANAISE A JtRUSALEM 1, 1 (2009) (Isr.), translated in http://
bcrfj.revues.org/6207?&id=6207 (noting that the Israeli Supreme Court is now consid-
ered "the final authority" on what the Israeli military may do in warfare). See generally
Yuval Shany, National Courts as International Actors: Jurisdictional Implications, FEDERAL-
ISMI.IT (uly 29, 2009), http://www.effective-intl-adjudication.org/admin/Reports/2af9e
d4d4a026e581437876ddlb73b87Yuval.pdf (contending that some courts are now de
facto international actors).
92. See Yael Ronen, Silent Enim Leges Inter Arma-but Beware of Background Noises:
Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of the Laws of Armed Conflict 22-23 (Int'l Law
Forum of the Hebrew Univ. ofJerusalem Law Faculty, Research Paper No. 07-11, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1953172 (describing
the role of Israeli courts in developing international criminal law); id. at 23-25 (describ-
ing the role of Israeli courts in developing the law of occupation).
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Department.93
And then there is the Israeli public sphere, which is lively and diverse.
During Operation Cast Lead, an estimated 10,000 people gathered to pro-
test the operation in Tel Aviv.94 To give just one example of the signifi-
cance of such non-state actors within Israel, one of the most reliable
sources of information about Israeli conduct during Operation Cast Lead
was the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem. B'Tselem describes its
mission as ensuring that the Israeli government protects the human rights
of residents in the Israeli-occupied territories and "complies with its obliga-
tions under international law."95 All of this suggests that the rationalist
model faces challenges in trying to depict Israel as a unitary state that can
identify and act on its preferences. Moreover, to the extent that rationalist
theory treats international law as impotent to shape state conduct, the real-
ities of the Israeli polity call rationalist assumptions into question.
The picture in the West Bank and Gaza is more complex still. Despite
the recent movement towards recognition of Palestine as a state,96 the West
Bank and Gaza remain only semi-autonomous and lack the vital ability to
maintain their own security.97 In Gaza, Hamas provides political leader-
ship, but Israel regards Hamas as a terrorist organization and disregards
Hamas' attempts to distinguish between its civil and administrative func-
tions and its military activities aimed at resisting Israeli authority. 98
The legislature of the Palestinian Authority is the Palestinian Legisla-
93. See Amichai Cohen, Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces: The
International Law Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian
Law, 26 CONN. J. INT'L L. 367, 370 (2011) (advocating for recognition of the role of the
International Law Department in promoting the internalization of international law
within the Israeli military); see also ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GAZA OPERA-
TIONS INVESTIGATIONS: AN UPDATE 3-8 (2010), http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/
8E841A98-1755-413D-AID2-8B30F64022BE/0/GazaOperationlnvestigationsUpdate.
pdf (outlining the processes within the Israeli military for investigation and prosecution
of Israeli soldiers accused of war crimes).
94. Rachel Shabi, West Bank Despair over Gaza Assault, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 7, 2009),
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/war.ongaza/2009/01/200916123826263533.html.
95. About B'Tselem, B'TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/aboutbtselem (last visited
Feb. 3, 2012).
96. In October 2011, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization (UNESCO) voted to admit Palestine as a full member of the organization. John
Irish, UNESCO Grants Palestinians Full Membership, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/3 1/us-palestinians-unesco-idUSTRE79U 1ZY201 110
31. The Palestinian Liberation Organization's bid for Palestine's full membership in the
UN has been blocked in the UN Security Council by the threat of a U.S. veto. Roxanne
Horesh, Debating the UN Bid for Palestinian Statehood, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 19, 2011), http:
//www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/09/201191910126371759.html.
97. See George E. Bisharat et al., Israel's Invasion of Gaza in International Law, 38
DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 41, 46 (2009) ("There is no dispute that the Gaza Strip is not a
sovereign state.").
98. See Laurie Blank, The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: A Critical Com-
mentary, in THE GOLDSTONE REPORT "RECONSIDERED" A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 203, 214 (Ger-
ald M. Steinberg & Anne Herzberg eds., 2011) (quoting an Israeli report on Operation
Cast Lead which characterizes Hamas as "a terrorist organization").
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tive Council.99 It has been unable to operate since June 2006 because the
Israeli armed forces arrested twenty-six of its members, along with eight
ministers in the Palestinian government. 00 Political differences between
the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas-led
administration in Gaza have further undermined the legitimacy of the Pal-
estinian Authority.10' In 2007, the Palestinian Authority instructed judi-
cial officers to leave their jobs.10 2 In violation of Palestinian law, the Gaza
authorities appointed "judges and prosecutors generally lacking experience
and independence."10 3 Palestinian political parties have their own armed
wings or armed groups with which they are affiliated.104 Tellingly, the
Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict
(the Goldstone Report) assesses the conduct of the Israeli armed forces
and "Palestinian armed groups,"' 0 since there is no group of armed forces
that can claim to represent a Palestinian state.
Even if rationalist theory could satisfactorily account for the conduct
of states and/or state actors, in the age of social media an adequate theory
must now also account for the fact that states have to respond to popular
movements that can communicate and organize with the speed of the
Internet.106 Not long after social media websites such Facebook and Twit-
ter became widely available, activists discovered that they could be used to
organize protest movements with an alacrity that could outpace states' abil-
ities to respond.107
Electronic social networks, including Twitter and Facebook, played an
important role in the coordination of peaceful demonstrations during the
Arab Spring.108 These social networks allowed protestors to communicate
with one another, as well as with the rest of the world, more readily than
they could otherwise do. As Kurt Anderson put it in Time magazine:
99. Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab
Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,
1 210, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sep. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report].
100. Id.
101. JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34074, THE PALESTINIANS: BACKGROUND
AND U.S. RELATIONS 8, 25-28 (2012); see also Bisharat et al., supra note 97, at 57-58.
102. Goldstone Report, supra note 99, 91 212
103. Id. c1 212.
104. Id.
105. Id. 91 439.
106. See John Pollock, Streetbook: How Egyptian and Tunisian Youth Hacked the Arab
Spring, MIT TECH. REv. (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/web/38
379/ (reporting that a Tunisian virtual reality scientist measured the amount of time it
took for political posts on Facebook to generate comments and that the time reduced
from four days in November 2010 to two hours in January 2011).
107. See generally Hannibal Travis, Wargaming the "Arab Spring": Predicting Likely
Outcomes and Planning U.N. Responses, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 75 (2013) (noting the role
of Facebook and Twitter in the Egyptian Revolution of Spring 2011).
108. See Bobby Ghosh, Rage, Rap and Revolution: Inside the Arab Youth Quake, TIME
(Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2050022,00.html
(asserting that the 2011 revolts were led by young people who used "modern tools, like
social-networking sites on the Internet and texting over mobile phones, to organize and
amplify their protests").
68 Vol. 46
2013 Non-State Actors in the Middle East
[Slocial media and smart phones did not replace face-to-face social bonds
and confrontation but helped enable and turbocharge them, allowing protes-
ters to mobilize more nimbly and communicate with one another and the
wider world more effectively than ever before. And in police states with high
Internet penetration - Ben Ali's Tunisia, Mubarak's Egypt, Bashar Assad's
Syria - a critical mass of cell-phone video recorders plus YouTube plus
Facebook plus Twitter really did become an indigenous free press. Through-
out the Middle East and North Africa, new media and blogger are now quasi
synonyms for protest and protester.10 9
Protesters used social media sites to share images and videos of brutality,
inspiring others to become involved.110 In addition, Facebook and Twitter
played an active role in informing fellow protestors about the logistics of
the protests, including locations and times."'
In areas where the government censored the Internet, outlets like
Facebook and Twitter provided protesters with freedom of press.11 2 The
mainstream media came to rely on social media to capture the immediacy
of the Arab Spring through videos uploaded to YouTube or through
messages from Twitter and Facebook that have the unfiltered, first-hand
appeal that traditional media cannot replicate." 3 In March 2011, a survey
revealed that nearly nine out of ten Egyptians and Tunisians used Facebook
to arrange protests and spread the word about such movements." 4 In
addition, 88% of Egyptians and 94% of Tunisians surveyed said that they
received information concerning protests from social networking
websites." 5
Because the social media are global in nature, they easily penetrate
national boundaries. Thus protesters in Bahrain adopted a popular Tuni-
sian song that became the "battle hymn of the Jasmine Revolution" that
toppled Tunisia's dictator, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, despite the fact that its
lyrics referenced a President, while Bahrain has a king.11 6 The same song
109. Kurt Andersen, The Protester, TIME (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132,00.html.
110. See, e.g., We Are All Khaled Said, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
elshaheeed.co.uk (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (the webpage was created by a Google exec-
utive, Wael Ghonim). Police allegedly dragged Said from a cybercaft in Alexandria and
beat him to death in the street because they feared that he would upload videos to the
internet showing police dealing drugs. Pollock, supra note 106.
111. See Pollock, supra note 106 (citing Ahmed Maher, an Egyptian activist who was
amazed when a Facebook page set up by protesters attracted 3000 new fans a day).
112. See Andersen, supra note 109 (observing that in states containing high internet
censorship, such as Ben Ali's Tunisia, Mubarak's Egypt, and Bashar El-Assad's Syria,
social networking sites served a function that is ordinarily reserved for the press).
113. See A Special Report on the News Industry: Bulletins from the Future, EcONoMIsT
(July 7, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18904136 (describing how the print
media has turned to social networks and websites to convey to society the "man-in-the-
street accounts" of events such as the Arab spring).
114. See Carol Huang, Facebook and Twitter Key to Arab Spring Uprisings: Report,
NATIONAL (June 6, 2011), http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/facebook-and-twit-
ter-key-to-arab-spring-uprisings-report (reporting the number of Tunisians and Egyp-
tians utilizing Facebook in protesting).
115. Id.
116. Ghosh, supra note 108.
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later inspired Egyptian protesters in Tahrir Square. 117
Rationalist theory can generate some useful models for understanding
state behavior even in conflicts as complex as those in the contemporary
Middle East. However, as the actors on which rationalist theory focuses
come increasingly to share the spotlight with actors it ignores, rationalism
loses its appeal as a descriptive and predictive model for international law
and IR theory. The nature of conflicts in the Middle East is so multi-fac-
eted and the relevance of state actors, as traditionally conceived in rational-
ist theory, is so diminished, the result is an utter breakdown of the theory
as a descriptive or predictive model.
III. Supplementing Rationalist Models with Normative Theory
At times the main lesson that rationalist international legal theory
seems to have drawn from IR realism is that law and legal norms do not
matter because ultimately states simply act in their own self-interest.11
While more flexible versions of rationalism acknowledge law as an exoge-
nous force that can affect state conduct,119 this final Part illustrates ways
in which other theoretical approaches can supplement rationalism usefully
by better illuminating the dynamic interactions among states, non-state
actors and legal norms.
Rationalists contend that theirs is the only comprehensive theory of
international law. They maintain that no sufficient alternative theory has
been proposed because a theory encompassing non-unitary states, non-
state actors, and behavioral economics "would be too complicated and fine-
grained to yield general insights or predictions." 120 That may well be true,
but while rationalism's parsimony might enable it to generate predictions,
those predictions are unreliable because rationalism's assumptions exclude
too many components that affect international law and politics.
In some ways, rationalism marks a return to the positivist notion that
law consists of a legal norm established by a due authority coupled with
the authority to coerce those subject to the norm into compliance.121
Rationalism thus loses sight of the more subtle ways in which international
law can influence behavior. As Paul Schiff Berman has pointed out, inter-
national law
may slowly change attitudes in large populations, effecting shifts in ideas of
appropriate state behavior. In addition, international legal norms may well
empower constituencies within a domestic polity and provide them with a
language for influencing state policy, thereby affording them leverage that
117. Id.
118. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 13.
119. See GuzMAN, supra note 8, at 17 (claiming that state interests are "exogenous and
fixed").
120. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 473.
121. See, e.g., H. L. A. HART ET AL., THE CONCEPT OF LAw 16 (1961) (characterizing J.
L. Austin's view of law as "an order backed by threats"); HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 56 (1948) (characterizing "true law" as a coercive order in
which only the centralized authority can exercise the legitimate use of force).
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they would not otherwise have had at their disposal.122
These insights are applicable both to the Libyan opposition to Colonel
Ghaddafi and to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
Law can directly shape state preferences.1 23 Berman writes of the
development of what sociolegal scholars have come to call "legal con-
sciousness" through which "international law norms may alter what both
governmental actors and larger populations view as 'right,' 'natural,' Just,'
or 'in their interest."124 Such legal consciousness clearly informed deci-
sion-making processes both within NATO and among the Libyan opposi-
tion factions. No existing theoretical models can adequately account for or
predict the behavior of the various factions in the Libyan opposition. Still,
normative theories that do not focus exclusively on state conduct are far
better equipped than rationalism to help us understand both the Libyan
opposition and the transnational factors that influenced NATO's decision
to intervene in Libya.
Critics of the Goldstone Report denounced it as an attempt "to shift
authority over critical judgments about the conduct of war from states to
international institutions,"125 but that shift has in fact been underway for
decades. As Oona Hathaway has suggested, some forms of rationalism are
tied to the new revisionist approach to international law and national
security law.126 But to the extent that such revisionism remains attached
to outmoded notions of sovereignty, it is out of touch not only with interna-
tional legal scholarship,1 27 but also with IR theory, which has come to
122. Berman, supra note 29, at 1266.
123. See Moravcsik, supra note 11, at 513 ("Societal ideas, interests, and institutions
influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social
purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments.").
124. Berman, supra note 29, at 1269. See generally id. 1280-95 (reviewing scholarly
literature on legal consciousness).
125. Peter Berkowitz, The Goldstone Report and International Law, in THE GOLDSTONE
REPORT "RECONSIDERED": A CRITIcAL ANALYSIS, supra note 98, at 181, 181.
126. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 8, at 1406-07 (contending that Posner
and Goldsmith's conclusions owe less to their rationalist theory than to their "deeply
held normative concerns" about a transfer of policy-making power from the political
branches to judges and international bodies, and characterizing these concerns as
revisionism).
127. On "sovereigntist" aspects of revisionism, see D.A. Jeremy Telman, Plural Vision:
International Law Seen Through the Varied Lenses of Domestic Implementation, 44 VAL. U.
L. REV. 759, 763 (2010) (noting that many revisionist scholars are better termed "sover-
eigntists" because of their view that state interests should trump international obliga-
tions); see also Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and
Holland, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1105, 1113-14 (2008) (defining sovereigntism as "a position
insistent on a nation's right to define and delineate its own lawmaking"); Peter J. Spiro,
Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 654 n.16 (2002)
(characterizing sovereigntism as "grounded in a general skepticism of international law
and international lawmaking processes"). Leading sovereigntists include academics
such as Jeremy Rabkin, Curtis Bradley, and Julian Ku, government officials such as John
Bolton, and people who have served as both scholars and government officials, such as
John Yoo and Jack Goldsmith. Examples of scholarship espousing a sovereigntist posi-
tion include: JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? (2005); JEREMY A. RABKIN, THE
CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004); JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (1998); JOHN
Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005); John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global
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appreciate the role of non-state actors in setting agendas in ways that affect
the exercise of power.128
Rationalists do not deny that states and non-state actors appeal to law
for various purposes. However, they tend to see such appeals as in them-
selves self-interested. 12 9 But this underestimates the degree to which actors
on the international stage view law as an independent force and overlooks
the fact that international legal norms have been internalized to such a
degree that it is often impossible to separate domestic values from interna-
tional norms. 130
Clearly, appeals to legal norms can be self-serving, but there comes a
point where appeals to legal norms would ring hollow if those who appeal
to the norms failed to implement them. For example, dictators such as
Ghaddafi and Assad gain little traction when they traffic in the language of
human rights because they have no credibility as defenders of the rule of
international human rights law. Similarly, Palestinian complaints about
Israeli human rights abuses are less effective than they might otherwise be
because of evidence of wide-ranging human rights abuses by the governing
authorities in the West Bank and Gaza.131 But Israel too has little credibil-
ity when it points to such evidence, because it has not established any
abiding interest in the human rights of Palestinians.
In Israel itself, it is clear that international norms inform the actions
of state actors, such as the International Law Group within the Israeli
armed forces, private citizens, such as the protestors who objected to Oper-
ation Cast Lead, and non-governmental organizations, such as B'Tselem.
International legal norms do not merely trickle down through state agents
and agencies; they circulate through the body politic in a dynamic network
of exchanges. State actors may resist the pressure that non-state actors in
civil society may seek to exert in favor of conformity with international
law, but in the long run, they do so at their peril.
Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley, International
Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1557
(2003); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000). As Julian Ku points out, at least
some sovereigntists object to the label. See Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the
Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 342 n.121 (2005)
(contending that people characterized as "[slovereigntists" are more interested in a cri-
tique of the "internationalist" conception of international law than in developing a pro-
sovereignty ideology).
128. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 5, at 53 (explaining that non-state actors can
set agendas by linking issues together and generating and controlling information and
expertise).
129. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 169 (concluding that "states provide
legal or moral justifications for their actions, no matter how transparently self-interested
their actions are").
130. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 5, at 54 (citing research that emphasizes how
norms can "shape behavior by providing states and nonstate actors with information
about interests" and that norms also embody social content).
131. See generally, e.g., Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (involv-
ing allegations of detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing by the Palestinian
Authority).
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Palestinian populations might well be among the world's best-versed
in international human rights and international humanitarian law norms.
Their lives are daily case studies in the variety of violations and test the
boundaries of what will be permitted without international outcry.
Despite significant efforts on the part of the numerous groups within the
Israeli government and civil society to promote human rights for Palestini-
ans, forty-plus years of military occupation have resulted in levels of
enmity that make violent confrontations routine, and violations of interna-
tional legal norms often follow. Moreover, the Palestinians are doubly vic-
timized, because their own civil authorities, as well as the armed groups
associated with Palestinian political parties, engage in human rights viola-
tions that also victimize Palestinian populations. Until a functioning
democracy can be established in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians will
not be able to safely call attention to the scope of this problem.
Conclusion
If the aim of rationalism is to provide a predictive theory of interna-
tional relations, its failure to account for the impact of non-state actors lim-
its its effectiveness as a tool for analyzing the contemporary Middle East.
Operation Cast Lead and the overthrow of Ghaddafi's regime in Libya sug-
gest not only that non-state actors matter, but that international legal
norms influence state and non-state actors in crucial ways. In the age of
electronic media, international legal theory and IR theory need to be much
more attuned to the complex dynamics through which international legal
norms can now be disseminated and deployed by both states and non-state
actors. Versions of normative theory receptive to the significance of non-
state actors and attuned to the independent valence of legal norms provide
scholars with better models for understanding the dynamics underlying
the conduct of all actors on the international political and legal scene.
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